The Hidden Risk of Non-Human Identities

If your identity program is only focused on employees and contractors, you're missing the fastest-growing and most overlooked risk in your environment: non-human identities.

Think about it—every application integration, API, service account, bot, and automation script that connects to your systems represents a non-human identity. And in most organizations, they now outnumber human users. The problem? These identities are rarely governed with the same rigor. No one "owns" them. They're rarely reviewed. And worse, they often have more privilege and a longer lifespan than any employee ever would.

Let’s break this down.

The Non-Human Identity Explosion

In the past, IAM programs were built around predictable, human-centric workflows: hire, onboard, role change, offboard. But the cloud, DevOps, and automation have changed the landscape. Now, for every person in your environment, there are dozens—or even hundreds—of non-human identities (NHIs):

• API tokens used for system-to-system calls

• Service accounts for apps and background jobs

• Robotic process automation (RPA) bots

• Scripts with embedded credentials

• CI/CD tools deploying infrastructure

These identities are not only growing in number—they’re also highly privileged, widely distributed, and often invisible to traditional IAM tools.

The Risk Factors: Why NHIs Deserve the Spotlight

First, there’s visibility. Most organizations don’t know how many non-human identities they have, let alone what those identities can access. They’re scattered across teams and hidden inside infrastructure, and nobody owns the big picture.

Then there’s lifecycle chaos. Unlike humans, NHIs don’t go through onboarding or exit interviews. They’re often created on the fly to solve a problem—"just make the integration work"—and never revisited. That script written by a former developer two years ago? Still running with admin access.

And don’t forget over-permissioning. Many non-human accounts are granted far more access than they need, simply because it’s faster. A backup tool might have full read/write access to production databases, even if it only reads data once a night.

These factors combine into a perfect storm: long-lived, over-permissioned, unaudited accounts that are easy targets for attackers.

Applying Lifecycle Principles to NHIs

So how do we bring non-human identities under control?

First, treat them like any other identity.

• Build a complete inventory: Catalog every service account, API key, machine identity, and automation bot. This requires collaboration with infrastructure, app, and DevOps teams.

• Classify them: What’s the purpose of this identity? What application is it tied to? Who owns it?

• Tie them to lifecycle events: If a service account is used by a specific app, its existence should be tied to that app’s lifecycle. When the app is decommissioned, so is the identity. If the identity is project-based, assign an expiration date.

Next, define and enforce governance policies:

• Implement regular access reviews: Just like humans, non-human identities should have their access reviewed at defined intervals.

• Set expiration or rotation policies: Every NHI should be reviewed for necessity and privilege. Credentials should be rotated frequently, ideally through an automated secrets manager.

• Track usage: If a service account hasn’t been used in 90 days, flag it. If it’s still logging in while supposedly retired, escalate it.

Segregation of Duties Applies Here Too

One of the most overlooked aspects of NHI governance is the application of Segregation of Duties (SoD) principles.

Here’s the reality: Just because it’s a bot or a system account doesn’t mean it’s immune to conflict. If a single NHI can create, approve, and execute a financial transaction—or provision, escalate, and delete access—it poses the same risk as a rogue employee.

That means:

• You must define SoD policies that account for system behaviors, not just human roles.

• When reviewing access, evaluate combinations of permissions held by NHIs against SoD rules.

• Tools that support SoD enforcement should be configured to flag risky combinations—even when the user in question isn’t a person.

Think of it this way: attackers don’t care whether they’re compromising a human or a bot. If a non-human identity has access to sensitive systems and no one’s watching, it’s an open door.

Establish Ownership and Accountability

Governance starts with ownership. Every non-human identity should have a designated human owner who is responsible for:

• Approving access changes

• Validating usage

• Responding to alerts or review requests

Without ownership, NHIs become unmanaged liabilities. If no one knows why a service account exists, no one will be motivated to clean it up.

Consider embedding NHI governance into onboarding for application owners and DevOps teams. Make it part of their responsibilities to maintain inventories, validate entitlements, and respond to reviews.

Final Thoughts: NHI Governance Is Not Optional

Non-human identities aren’t going away. In fact, they’ll continue to outpace human users as systems become more integrated and automation grows.

That’s why you can’t treat them as second-class citizens in your identity program.

• Apply the same lifecycle principles.

• Enforce the same access governance.

• Monitor and report on them like you would any high-risk user.

If your IAM policies don’t include NHIs, you’re only solving half the problem—and leaving the back door wide open.